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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is an appeal from a directed verdict ruling that one-half of the water sold to the 
Warrouses by the Kkigs did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon the death of Raymond 
Watrous and the ttial court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's Motion under Rule 60(b) URCP to 
set aside the Order on the Kings motion for a directed verdict so that he could appeal the 
order on the King's directed verdict. 
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ARGUMENT 
AS A MATER OF LAW, THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO 
HEAR OR RULE ON THE KINGS' CLAIM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' 
INTEREST IN THE WATER RIGHTS THEY SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, DID 
NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
THEREFORE, THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND 
REVERSD3LE ERROR WHEN IT GRANTED THE KINGS' MOTION FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT, CLAIMING THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST 
IN THE WATER SOLD TO THE WATROUSES, BY THE KINGS, DED NOT 
PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS' DEATH. THE 
TRIAL COURT ALSO COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE 
ERROR AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO SET ASIDE 
THAT PORTION OF ITS DHtECTED VERDICT HOLDING THAT RAYMOND 
WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED 
WATROUS UPON RAYMOND WATROUS' DEATH. 
POINT I 
THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND RULE ON MR. 
HENSHAW'S APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DIRECTED VERDICT 
HOLDING THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' INTEREST IN THE WATER 
RIGHTS, SOLD TO THE WATROUSES BY THE KINGS, DID NOT PASS TO 
MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear and rule on Mr. Henshaw's appeal of the trial 
court's Order On Motions For Directed Verdict, (hereinafter, "the Directed Verdict"), 
holding that Raymond Watrous' interest in the water rights sold to the Watrouses by the 
Kings, (hereinafter, "Raymond Watrous' water rights"), did not pass to Mildred Watrous 
at the time of Raymond's death, because the trial court never had jurisdiction to hear or 
consider the King's claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death.1 
1. Although Mr. Henshaw did not specifically argue in the trial court that the trial 
court did not have jurisdiction to hear or rule upon the Kings' claim that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, 
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and in any proceeding. In State v. Valdez. 65 P. 3d 
1191(Ct. App. 2003) this court stated: "It is well-settled that subject matter jurisdiction 
may be raised at any time, by either party or the court. See State v. Perank, 858 P. 2d 
927, 930 (Utah 1992). " 
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As previously established in Mr. Henshaw's opening brief, a party asserting a 
claim must show that he has standing to assert any such claim. In Haymondv. 
Bonneville Billing & Collections 89 P.3d 171 (Utah 2004), the Utah Supreme Court 
discussed the applicable standards for standing in Utah. In Bonneville, the Supreme 
Court specifically held that: 
As a general rule, a person can sustain a cause of action only where he has 
sustained some injury to his legal personal or property rights, the injury 
and the cause of action being contemporaneous." 1A C.J.S. Actions § 32a 
(1985); Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145. 1148 (Utah 1983). 
(Emphasis added). 
As a part of both of their counterclaims, filed in conjunction with their answer, and 
their amended answer, the Kings asserted a claim for quiet title. (Record 24-31, 646-
653). In those claims for quiet title, the Kings sought to have the trial court rule that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. In pertinent part, both the Kings' counterclaim and amended 
counterclaim read as follows: 
Defendants Jack and Bonnie King counterclaim against Plaintiffs Barbara, Dee 
and Dana Henshaw, as follows: 
6. The Kings are the owners of certain water rights in and to Pine Creek 
including, but not limited to, those rights represented by the Utah Division of 
Water Rights, Water Right nos. 95-1629 and 95-5 17. 
7. The Plaintiffs claim an interest in the water rights adverse to the Kings. The 
Plaintiffs 'claim is without any right whatever, and the Plaintiffs have no estate, 
right, title, lien or interest in or to the water rights or any part of the water rights. 
8. Since approximately July, 1992, the Plaintiffs have used and continue to use 
water from Pine Creek. 
9. The Plaintiffs have no right to use water from Pine Creek, and their use of 
such water has harmed the defendants. 
WHEREFORE, the defendants request the Court: 
1. Require that the Plaintiffs, and all persons claiming under them, set forth the 
nature of their claims to the water rights described herein. 
2. Determine all adverse claims to the water rights described herein by decree of 
the Court. 
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3. Declare that defendants Jack and Bonnie King, own in fee simple and are 
entitled to the quiet and peaceful possession of the water rights described in this 
Complaint and that the Plaintiffs and all persons claiming under them have no 
right to or interest in the water rights or arty part thereof 
4. Permanently enjoin the Plaintiffs, each of them, and all persons claiming 
under them from asserting any adverse claim to the Kings 'title to the water rights, 
and from using any water from Pine Creek (Emphasis added). 
Because the Kings asserted counterclaims, they were required to demonstrate that 
they had standing to assert those claims, i.e., that they had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous9 water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. The Kings did not do so, and they could not do so. Therefore, they 
lacked standing to even ask the trial court to hear or consider their claim that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, 
and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to hear and rule upon the Kings' claim that 
Raymond Watrous' interest in the water did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. 
In Jenkins v. Swan. 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"the moving party must have standing to invoke the jurisdiction of the court" In Gedo 
v. Rose, 2007 UT App 154, 2007 P.3d (2007 UT App 154), this Court stated: 
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must exist before a court may 
entertain a controversy. See Jones v. Barlow, 2007 UT 20, y2, 154 P.3d 808. 
Without the jurisdictional requirement of standing, a court has no authority to act 
(Emphasis added). 
Because the Kings did not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water 
rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, the trial court did 
not have jurisdiction to even hear or consider the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. Therefore, 
the directed verdict entered by the trial court holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights 
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did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death is void as a matter of 
law, and this Court has jurisdiction to hear and rule on Mr. Henshaw's appeal of that 
portion of the directed verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT NEVER HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR OR 
RULE UPON THE KINGS' CLAM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' WATER 
RIGHTS DH) NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF 
RAYMOND'S DEATH, THAT PORTION OF THE DIRECTED VERDICT 
HOLDING THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS 
TO MILDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH IS VOID 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THAT PORTION OF THE DIRECTED 
VERDICT MUST BE REVERSED AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
A. MR, HENSHAW WAS NOT REQUIRED TO PROVIDE: EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING HIS CLAIM THAT THE KINGS' LACKED STANDING TO ASSERT 
THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED 
WATROUS AT THE TTME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
1) Mr. Henshaw Was Not Required To Prove That Raymond Watrous' Water 
Rights Passed To Mildred Watrous At The Time Of Raymond's Death. 
Contrary to the Kings' assertion, Mr. Henshaw was not required to present any 
evidence proving that he acquired Raymond Watrous' water rights, that the Kings 
repeatedly admitted they sold to the Watrouses. Rather, it is the Kings' legal obligation 
to first prove that they had standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights 
did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, and second to prove 
that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time 
of Raymond's death. 
The Kings falsely claim that: "Mr. Henshaw's case was essentially an action to 
quiet title to water rights... " (Kings' Memorandum, page 20, fl 1), and "Henshaw filed 
this action in July of 2000 to quiet title to his alleged water rights.) (Kings' 
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Memorandum, page 4, f 2). However, Mr. Henshaw did not assert a cause of action for 
quiet title in either his original Complaint or in his Amended Complaint,2 and subsequent 
to the court orally granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict, Mr. Henshaw was 
permitted to assert his claims to the jury that he had an easement to connect the three-inch 
waterline to the Kings' six-inch waterline, that he had the right to use the six-inch 
waterline to water his property, and that the Kings sold water rights to the Watrouses, 
which rights were later sold to Barbara Henshaw and then sold to Mr. Henshaw. (Record 
1089-1094). The trial court did not authorize Mr. Henshaw to assert a claim of quiet title 
subsequent to its oral decision granting the Kings' motion for a directed verdict (Record 
1089-1094). Therefore, the Kings' claim that Mr. Henshaw was required to produce 
evidence supporting his claim for quiet of title is a deliberate misrepresentation of the 
facts and the law.3 Mr. Henshaw had no such obligation. 
2) Bepflusq The Kings Filed Two Counterclaims, Asserting Claims For Quiet Titte, 
They Were Required To Afitoativdy Prove That They Had Staging To Claim 
That Raymond Wafrous' Water Rights Did Not Pass To Mildred Wafrpus At The 
Time Of Raymond's death, M d They Were Also Required To Prove That, In Fact, 
Raymond Wagons' Water Rights Did Not Pass To Mildred Wattows At The Time 
Of Raymond's Death. 
The Kings specifically asserted claims for quiet of title in both their answer and 
2. The Henshaws filed suit against Jack King alleging causes for 1) Breach of Contract, 
2) Tortuous Interference, 3) Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 4) Theft 
or Conversion, 5) Harassment, and 6) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress on July 
14, 2000. The Henshaws filed an Amended Complaint asserting the same causes of 
action on August 22, 2003, and added Bonnie King as a defendant. (Record 1-16, 467-
481, 738-755, 789-821). 
3. The Kings make the ridiculous claim that standing only applies to "plaintiffs." 
"The numerous cases cited by Henshaw in support of his argument all provide that 
standing requires "a plaintiff" show some distinct an palpable injury. " (Kings' brief, 
page, 22, ^ fs 1-3.) The Kings also falsely claim that: "First, the Kings are the 
defendants in this proceeding not the plaintiffs. " (Kings' brief, page, 22, \ 3.) 
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amended answer. (Record 24-31, 646-653).4 Therefore, under clear and uncontroverted 
law, the Kings had the obligation to first prove that they had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, and second that Raymond Watrous' water rights, in fact, did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death.5 They did not do so, and they 
cannot do so. Therefore, as a matter of law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to even 
entertain the Kings claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, and the directed verdict holding that the 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death must be reversed as a matter of law. 
B. BECAUSE IT IS THE KINGS THAT HAVE THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT 
RAYMOND WATROUS' WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED 
WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND'S DEATH. MR. HENSHAW IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO PROVIDE THIS COURT WITH A TRANSCRIPT OF THE TRIAL OF 
THIS MATTER. 
Contrary to the Kings' assertion, Mr. Henshaw is under no obligation to provide 
this Court with a transcript of the trial of this matter, and as the Kings admit, even if Mr. 
Henshaw had provided this Court with a transcript of the trial, that transcript would be of 
no benefit to the Court in this proceeding. (Kings' brief, page 25, f 3). 
Mr. Henshaw has no legal obligation to provide any evidence that would tend to 
4. SfiS page 2, Tf 3 of this memorandum. 
5. The Kings admit in their brief that they had the obligation to quiet title to the water 
sold to the Watrouses based on the strength of their own claims to quiet title. (Kings' 
brief, page, 20, ^  1.) ' "In an action to quiet title to water rights, a plaintiff must succeed 
on the strength of his own title, not the weakness of the defendant's. "' Citing Church v. 
Meadow Springs Ranch Corp. Inc.. 659 P.2d (Utah 1983). Apparently, the Kings are 
again arguing that only "plaintiffs" have to "succeed on the strength of his own title, not 
the weakness of the defendant's, " not counterclaim plaintiffs. 
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support the Kings' claims that they either had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death or that, in 
fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. 
Likewise, Mr. Henshaw had no personal reason to provide any evidence that 
would tend to support the Kings' claims that they either had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
Because Mr. Henshaw did not file a cause of action seeking to quite title to the 
Raymond's water rights, he was under no obligation to provide the trial court with any 
evidence proving that Raymond's water rights passed to Mildred at the time of 
Raymond's death. Likewise, because Mr. Henshaw did not file a cause of action seeking 
to quite title to the Raymond's water rights, he is under no obligation to provide this 
Court \yith any evidence proving that Raymond's water rights passed to Mildred at the 
time of Raymond's death. 
However, because the Kings asserted counterclaims seeking to quiet title to the 
water rights they sold to the Watrouses and asked the trial court to rule that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of his death, the Kings 
had the obligation to provide evidence to the trial court to prove that they had standing to 
do so. They did not do so, and, as established in Mr. Henshaw's Initial Brief, they could 
not do so. (Henshaw Initial Brief, pages 15-17). Furthermore, even when responding to 
Mr. Henshaw's Initial Brief, the Kings have not attempted to assert any evidence, or 
claim the existence of any evidence, that would establish that they had standing to assert 
that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of his 
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death. The Kings simply made the ludicrous assertion that standing only applies to 
plaintiffs. (Kings9 brief, page 22, %s 2-3). 
Because Mr. Henshaw did not file a cause of action seeking to quite title to the 
Raymond's water rights, he was under no obligation to provide the trial court with any 
evidence proving that Raymond's water rights passed to Mildred at the time of 
Raymond's death. Likewise, because Mr. Henshaw did not file a cause of action seeking 
to quite title to the Raymond's water rights, he is under no obligation to provide this 
Court with any evidence proving that Raymond's water rights passed to Mildred at the 
time of Raymond's death. 
However, if the Kings believe that they had standing to assert a claim that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, the Kings had the obligation to provide this Court with evidence in the 
record of the trial court supporting that assertion, because under clear and controlling 
Utah law, a party has the legal obligation to prove they have standing to assert a claim. In 
response to Mr. Henshaw's assertions, in his Initial Brief, the Kings did nothing other 
than claim that standing only applies to plaintiffs. (Kings' brief, page 22, fs 2-3). 
The Kings have never claimed that a transcript of the trial would produce any 
evidence supporting their assertion that they had standing to claim that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, 
and because the Kings themselves did not request a transcript of the trial to show that 
there was in fact evidence from which the trial court could conclude that the Kings have 
standing to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death, this Court cannot conclude that the evidence introduced at 
trial supports the Kings claim that they had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. In fact, 
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given the facts of this case, this Court must conclude that there was no evidence 
introduced at trial that would support that portion of the Directed Verdict holding that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death 
or that the Kings had standing to even claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
C. THE AUDIO RECQDING OF THE TRIAL CONTAINS NO EVIDENCE TO 
INDICATE THAT THE KINGS HAVE STANDING TO ASSERT THAT RAYMOND 
WATROUS' WATER RIGHTS DID NOT PASS TO MILDRED WATROUS UPON 
RAYMOND'S DEATH. 
In this case, it is only reasonable and logical to assume that audio recordings of the 
trial, through the time that the trial court orally granted the Kings' motion for a directed 
verdict, holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death, would not contain any evidence supporting the Kings' 
claims that they either had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
The Kings correctly cite to Horton v. Gem State Mut Of Utah. 749 P.2d 847 
(Utah Ct App. 1990) for the proposition that an appellate court may generally be 
required to presume that a trial court's judgment is correct when the appellant fails to 
provide the appellate court with a transcript of the evidence from which the appellate 
court can make a determination as to whether or not the evidence supports the judgment. 
However, when, as in this case, it was the Kings' obligation to not only provide the trial 
court with proof that they had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did 
not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, but also to provide the trial 
court with evidence proving that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to 
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Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, it is not logical or reasonable to assume 
that Mr. Henshaw would have provided the trial court with evidence in his case-in-chief 
to support the Kings' assertions either that either they had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
Mr. Henshaw only had reasons to provide the trial court with evidence showing 
that the Kings had no standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did pass to 
Mildred Watrous upon Raymond' death. The last thing Mr. Henshaw would have done is 
to introduce any evidence at trial supporting the Kings' claims that they either had 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
Mr. Henshaw argued from the first time the Kings claimed that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death, that the 
Kings had no stand to make such a claim. Mr. Henshaw would not argue that the Kings 
did not have standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' 
water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, and then 
provide the trial court with evidence establishing such. To suggest that Mr. Henshaw 
would provide the trial court with evidence in direct opposition to his clams and self-
interest is illogical at best. 
Because the oral ruling on the Kings' motion for a directed verdict came at the end 
of Mr. Henshaw's case in chief, the Kings had no opportunity to present any evidence to 
the trial court supporting their claims that they either had standing to assert that Raymond 
-10-
Watrous5 water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond" death or 
that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time 
of Raymond's death. The Kings were only permitted to cross examine Mr. Henshaw and 
his witnesses, within the boundaries of their direct testimony, and because it was not in 
Mr. Henshaw's interest to provide the trial court with any evidence tending to support the 
Kings' claims that they either had standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights 
did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death or that, in fact, that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, the Kings did not present, and could not have presented, the trial court 
with any evidence supporting their claims that they either had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
Any evidence would have shown that the Kings had standing to claim that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death had to be produced prior to the time the Directed Verdict was granted, 
i.e., before the close of Mr. Henshaw's case-in-chief. No evidence was presented 
because none exists, and the Kings cannot produce any such evidence for this Court. 
After the trial court granted the Kings' motion for a directed verdict, there was 
certainly no reason for the Kings to attempt to prove that they had standing to claim that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, and they did not attempt to do so. Consequently, there is no evidence 
r 
in the audio recordings of the trial, of this matter, that supports the Kings' assertion that 
they have standing to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. 
-11-
because Mr. Henshaw had no legal obligation or personal interest in providing the 
trial court with any evidence supporting the King's claims that they either had standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, because the Kings never had the opportunity to 
provide the trial court with any evidencing supporting their claims that they either had 
standing to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass 
to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, this Court must not assume, as it 
might in another factual situation, that there is any evidence whatsoever in the audio 
recordings of the trial that supports the Kings' claims that they either had standing to 
assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death or that, in fact, Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. However, it the Kings believe that there is any 
such evidence anywhere in the audio recordings of the trial, Mr. Henshaw will stipulate 
that they can locate that evidence and provide it to this Court to support their claims and 
arguments set forth in their brief. 
The Kings did not attempt to provide this Court with any evidence in the record to 
support their claim that they have standing to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights 
did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, because they know that 
neither the record of the trial court nor the audio recordings of the trial of this matter will 
produce an iota of evidence supporting their assertion that they have standing to claim 
that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. Therefore, they cannot now claim that this Court must assume that the 
trial court had evidence before it from which it could conclude that the Kings have 
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standing to claim that Raymond Watrous5 water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death. 
Because there is no reason why the audio recordings of the trial of this matter 
would contain any evidence supporting the Kings' assertion that the Kings had standing 
to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time 
of Raymond's death, because there is every reason why the recordings of the trial of this 
matter would not contain any evidence supporting the Kings' assertion that the Kings had 
standing to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death, because the Kings have never claimed that a transcript of 
the trial would produce any evidence supporting their assertion that they had standing to 
claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, and because the Kings themselves did not request a transcript of the 
trial to show that there was in fact evidence from which the trial court could conclude that 
the Kings have standing to claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to 
Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, this Court must not conclude that the 
evidence introduced at trial supports the Kings claim that they had standing to assert that 
Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death. In fact, given the facts of this case, this Court must conclude that there 
was no evidence introduced at trial that would support that portion of the Directed 
Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous 
upon Raymond's death or that the Kings had standing to even claim that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
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POINT HI 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO EVEN 
HEAR THE KINGS' CLAIM THAT RAYMOND WATROUS' WATER RIGHTS 
DID NOT PASS TO MBLDRED WATROUS AT THE TIME OF RAYMOND'S 
DEATH, THE COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S RULE 60(B) MOTION. 
Because the trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear or rule upon the Kings' 
motion for a directed verdict asking it to rule that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not 
pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, the trial court was required as a 
matter of law to grant Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion, and its failure to do so is 
prejudicial and reversible error. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR 
WHEN IT SIGNED AND ENTERED THE DIRECTED VERDICT PRIOR TO THE 
TIME FOR MR. HENSHAW TO FILE AN OBJECTION TO THE DIRECTED 
VERDICT HAP EXPIRED. 
The Kings' claims that they mailed the Directed Verdict.to Mr. Henshaw on May 
4, 2006. (Kings' brief, page 28, f 1). Therefore, it is an undisputed that when the 
applicable provisions of the URCP are applied to this case, the trial court was not legally 
entitled to sign or enter the Directed Verdict until May 16, 2006 at the earliest, and the 
Kings were not entitled to even submit the Directed Verdict to the trial court for signature 
until May 16, 2006 at the earliest. Nonetheless, the trial court signed and entered the 
Directed Verdict on May 15, 2006, prior to the time for Mr. Henshaw to object to the 
Directed Verdict had expired. 
In Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc.T v. Fifth District Court. 933 P.2d 1011, (Utah 1997), 
the Utah Supreme Court ruled that when the Fifth District Court entered an order 
forfeiting a bond, before the time expired permitting execution on the bond, the order 
permitting execution upon the bond must be set aside. The Court stated: 
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in both cases, however, bond was ordered forfeited before ninety days had elapsed 
from the notice of entry of judgment upon the bail Section 77--20a-2(2) makes 
clear that "fejxecution on a judgment upon the bail may not issue in less than 90 
days after the completion of the mailing or service of a notice of entry of judgment 
upon the surety." Thus, the trial court prematurely ordered the bonds forfeited 
before the statutory time for execution on the bond. The order of execution is 
therefore set aside. 
The reasoning and holding of Beehive Bail Bonds, Inc., is directly relevant and applicable 
to this case. Because it is undisputed that the trial court entered the Directed Verdict 
before the time permitted for Mr. Henshaw to object to the Directed Verdict had expired, 
under the holding and reasoning of Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc.. the Directed Verdict, that 
was prematurely entered, must be vacated. 
The trial court and the Kings both claim that Tolboe Construction Co.r v. Staker 
Paving and Construction Co.. 682 P.2d 843 (Utah 1984) stands for the proposition that 
courts are not bound by the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP. However, the version of 
Rule 2.9 FRCP reviewed in Tolboe. and in effect in 1982, is substantially different from 
the present 7(f)(2) URCP applicable in this case. The Tplboe court stated: 
The rule requires first that a copy of the documents be served upon opposing 
counsel before the said documents are presented to the court for signature.... 
The rule's only other requirement is that the notice of objection to the said 
documents be submitted to both the court and counsel within five days after 
service. (Emphasis added). 
Rule 7(f)(2) URCP, in effect at the time the Kings prematurely submitted the 
Directed Verdict to the trial court, also provides: uThe party preparing the order shall 
file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or the expiration of the time 
to object." (Emphasis added). Therefore, it is indisputable that the Kings were not even 
entitled to submit the Directed Verdict to the trial court for signature until the time for 
Mr. Henshaw to object to the Directed Verdict had expired. 
In Tolboe the trial court considered and ruled on the objections before the time to 
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appeal had expired. In this case the trial court ruled on Mr. Henshaw's objections to the 
Directed Verdict after the time to appeal the Directed Verdict had expired. Additionally, 
the holding ofTolboe was tacitly overruled in Beehive Bail Bonds. Inc., supra. 
In Wiscombe v. Wiscombe. 744 P.2d 1024 (Utah App. 1987), the Utah Court of 
Appeals stated: 
[TJhe demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure 
and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and just to the parties involved." 
Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P. 2d338, 341 (Utah 1980). One of the fundamental 
requisites of due process is the opportunity to be fully heard. Worrall v. Ogden 
City Fire Dept, 616 P. 2d 598, 601 (Utah 1980). 
Clearly in this case the entry of the Directed Verdict prior to the expiration of the time for 
Mr. Henshaw to object to Directed Verdict constitutes a denial of Mr. Henshaw's 
"opportunity to be fully heard'' as mandated in Wiscombe. Thus the premature signing 
and entry of the Directed Verdict denied Mr. Henshaw his "fundamental" due process 
right to the "opportunity to be fully heard" on his objections to the Directed Verdict and 
appeal the Directed Verdict as mandated in Wiscombe. 
The premature execution and filing of the Directed Verdict on May 15, 2006, was 
invalid and denied Mr. Henshaw his due process and equal protection rights. Therefore, 
this Court must enter an order vacating the Directed Verdict, even assuming that the trial 
court had jurisdiction to sign and enter the Directed Verdict, which it did not. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED 
PREJUDICIAL AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DENIED MR. HENSHAW'S 
RULE 60B MOTION. 
The Kings are correct when they state that the time for filing a notice of appeal is 
not affected by failure of a party to comply with the provisions of Rule 58A(d) of the 
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URCP. However, the failure of a party to comply with the provisions of Rule 58A(d) is a 
factor to be considered when ruling on a motion under Rule 60(b) URCP. 
In Workman v.Nagle. 802 P.2d 7489 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court, in 
discussing the necessity of complying with Rule 58A(d) URCP declared: 
However, the failure to give the required notice is an important factor in 
determining the timeliness of post-judgment proceedings, where an exact time 
limit is not prescribed. If a party has had notice of the judgment but has 
nevertheless remained idle in attacking it in the court of rendition or in appealing 
it, that lack of diligence is a strong reason not to disturb the judgment On the 
other hand, if a losing party has remained ignorant of a judgment in part because 
the prevailing party has not complied with Rule 58A(d). the resulting delay is 
more reasonable for purposes of Rule 60(b)(5)—(7). Rule 58A(d) and the current 
Rule 4—504 are therefore not inert desiderata. Rather, while non-compliance with 
those rules does not bring about the automatic invalidity of an entered judgment 
it is a weighty factor in determining the timeliness of later challenges to the 
judgment under Utah RCiv.P. 60(b)(5) through (7). (Emphasis added). 
The Kings admit that they never served Mr. Henshaw with a copy of the signed 
and entered Directed Verdict, as mandated by Rule 58A(d) URCP. (King's brief, page 
31, If 1). However, they claim that their failure to do so was not deliberate. Id. 
Nonetheless, given the history of this case and the delays in obtaining rulings on motions 
or requests, it was not unreasonable for Mr. Henshaw to fail to check with the trial court 
to see if the Directed Verdict had been signed and entered, especially in light of the 
Kings' filing of their memorandum in response to Mr. Henshaw's objection to the 
Directed Verdict. 
The Kings also claim that they did not know that the Directed Verdict had been 
entered, and, therefore, they 'filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of their proposed 
Order and Judgment... " (King's brief, page 31, footnote 7). However, under the 
provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP, the Kings were not even entitled to file any response to 
Mr. Henshaw's Objection to the Directed Verdict. 
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in pertinent part, Rule 7 UKCP provides as follows: 
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial 
memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, 
within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a 
proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to the proposed 
order shall be filed within five days after service. The party preparing the order 
shall file the proposed order upon being served with an objection or upon 
expiration of the time to object (Emphasis added). 
There is no part of Rule 7(f)(2) URCP that permits a party who has prepared and 
submitted an order to the opposing party to file any type of memorandum in support of 
the proposed order or judgment. 
A party that has prepared and submitted a proposed order or judgment to another 
party is only entitled to either submit the proposed order or judgment upon the receipt of 
an objection or to submit the proposed order or judgment upon the expiration of the time 
to object, A party is not permitted to file any type of response to an objection. Rule 
7(f)2) URCP supra. 
The fact that the Kings once again ignored the express provisions of Rule 7(f)(2) 
URCP, when filing their memorandum in support of directed verdict and judgment, 
demonstrates that their failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 7(f)(2), when 
submitting the Directed Verdict to the trial court twelve days before the time for Mr. 
Henshaw to object to the Directed Verdict had expired, was not a mere oversight, or are 
the Kings claiming that they filed the memorandum in response to Mr. Henshaw's 
objection to the Directed Verdict inadverently? The Kings simply filed their 
memorandum in response to Mr. Henshaw's objection in an attempt to prevent Mr. 
Henshaw from learning that the Directed Verdict had been improperly submitted to the 
trial court and had been signed and entered before the time for Mr. Henshaw to object to 
the Directed Verdict had expired. 
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It is also instructive that the Kings failed to abide by the provisions of Rule 50 
URCP when asking the trial court to overrule the jury's finding that Mr. Henshaw owned 
the water they sold to the Watrouses. In pertinent part, Rule 50 URCP provides: 
Not later than ten days after entry of judgment a party who has moved for a 
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment entered thereon 
set aside and to have judgment entered in accordance with his motion for a 
directed verdict: or if a verdict was not returned such party, within ten days after 
the jury has been discharged, may move for judgment in accordance with his 
motion for a directed verdict (Emphasis added). 
The juiy entered its verdict on April 20, 2006, holding that the water rights the 
Kings sold to the Watrouses belonged to Mr. Henshaw rather than to the Kings. (Record, 
1073-1074 ) The Kings filed their motion for a judgment not on the verdict (hereinafter, 
"JNOV"), on May 8, 2006. (Record, 1060-1061). However, the Judgment was not 
signed and entered until May 15, 2006. (Record, 1073-1074). Therefore, the Kings were 
not even entitled to file their JNOV until May 26, 2006 at the earliest 
However, if the Kings were calculating their time to file the JNOV from the date 
the jury entered its verdict, the Kings had to file the JNOV no later than May 4, 2006. 
Ergo, either the Kings filed their JNOV four days late or seven days to early. But 
whichever it is, they again totally ignored the applicable provisions of the URCP. 
If the Kings had simply failed to comply with one provision of the URCP or one 
Rule of the URCP, then perhaps their claim that they inadvertently submitted the 
Directed Verdict to the trial court before Mr. Henshaw's time to object to the Directed 
Verdict had expired would possibly be believable, or if the Kings had simply failed to 
provide Mr. Henshaw with a Notice of Judgment as mandated by Rule 58A(d) URCP, it 
might be believable that the Kings simply forgot to send Mr. Henshaw a Notice of 
Judgment. However, when the Kings improperly submitted the Directed Verdict to the 
trial court for signature, improperly filed a memorandum in opposition to Mr. Henshaw's 
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objections to the Directed Verdict, failed to provide Mr. Henshaw with a Notice of 
Judgment as mandated by Rule 58A URCP, and failed to comply with the provisions of 
Rule 50 URCP when filing their JNOV, it strains credulity to claim that all of those 
failures to comply with the URCP were simply due to inadvertence, rather than deliberate 
actions or inactions. 
The repeated and consistent disregard for the URCP shows that the Kings were 
deliberately ignoring the appropriate provisions of the URCP, and they were doing so to 
prevent Mr. Henshaw from learning that the Directed Verdict had been signed and 
entered. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Mr. 
Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
POINT IV 
MR. HENSHAW'S APPEAL IS NOT IN VIOLATION OF RULE 33 URAP. IT IS 
THE KINGS' OPPOSITION TO MR. HENSHAW'S APPEAL THAT IS FILED IN 
BAD FAITH, NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY FACTS, NOT GROUNDED IN FACT, 
NOT WARRANTED BY EXISTING LAW, OR BASED ON AN GOOD FAITH 
ARGUMENT TO EXTEND, MODIFY, OR REVERSE EXISTING LAW. 
The Kings have not converted, and cannot controvert, Mr. Henshaw's assertion 
that they do not have standing, and never had standing, to assert a claim that Raymond 
Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon Raymond's death. 
The Kings have not demonstrated, and cannot demonstrate, that they are potential 
heirs, devisees, creditors of Raymond, or any other category of person or entity that do 
not have standing to assert any type of claim against Raymond Watrous' estate, or to 
claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death. 
Because none of the potential heirs, devisees or creditors of Raymond Watrous 
ever claimed that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death, the Kings are required to show that they have standing, on their own, 
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to assert that Mildred Watrous did not acquire all of Raymond Watrous' water rights at 
the time of Raymond's death or that they are authorized by an heir, devisee, creditor, or 
other person or entity to assert a claim against Raymond Watrous' estate on behalf of any 
such person or entity. 
Alternatively, the Kings have to show that the disposition of Raymond Watrous' 
water rights is of such great public interest that they are entitled, on behalf of the public 
at large, to assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death. 
The Kings cannot "show some distinct and palpable injury that gives rise to a 
personal stake in the outcome of the dispute, " as mandated under Utah law. The Kings 
cannot demonstrate some great public interest that would give them standing to even 
assert a claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous upon 
Raymond's death. Therefore, their opposition to Mr. Henshaw's appeal is frivolous as 
defined in Rule II URCP and UCA § 78-27-56. 
Furthermore^ the Kings' assertion of a claim to quiet title to the water they sold to 
the Watrouses, which was eventually acquired by Mr. Henshaw was a per se violation of 
Rule 11 URCP, and, therefore, their opposition to Mr. Henshaw's appeal of the Directed 
Verdict is also a per se violation of Rule Rule 11 URCP and UCA § 78-27-56. 
At his deposition on August 23,2004, Jack King made the following admissions 
under oath: 
3 Q. Okay. Then you're admittinghere today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
5 hours full flow ofPinecreek water? 
6 A. Every 18 days. 
7 Q. Every 18 days; is that correct? 
8 A. That's right. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
24 Q. Okay. 
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25 Are you now admitting, then, that the 
1 plaintiffs have the right to use waterfront Pinecreek 
2 for irrigation? 
3 A. They ~ they have 3 hours of every 18 days, 
4 but not through my pipeline. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
14 You've admitted that the Henshaws have the 
15 right to use some water; correct? 
16 A. 1 admit that they had the right to use 3 hours 
17 out of every 18 days. 
19 Q. Are you now admitting that Exhibit No. 1 is in 
20 fact a water deed for the sale of 3 hours of Pinecreek 
21 water to Watresses? 
22 A. Well, yeah, they got 3 hours. 
23 Q. Okay. 1 just want to make it crystal clear 
24 here because this has been the problem from day one of 
25 this. 
1 A. It shouldn't have been because Fve already 
2 admitted that a long time ago. 
3 Q. Okay. Then you're admitting here today, for 
4 the record, unequivocally, that you sold the Watresses 3 
5 hours full flow of Pinecreek water? 
6 A. Every 18 days. . 
7 Q. Every 18 days; is that correct? 
8 A. Thafs right 
9 Q. Okay. Great. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
2 A, Well, you -- you fve already established with 
3 Grace Potter that 1 deeded them over the three hours. 
4 Q. You deeded them over the three hours? 
5 A. Thafs right. 
6 Q. Okay. So they own the three hours; is that 
7 correct? 
8 A. I guess they do. 
9 Q. Okay. Excellent. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
25 Q. Are you now admitting, then, that the 
1 plaintiffs have the right to use water from Pinecreek 
2 for irrigation? 
3 A. They — they have 3 hours of every 18 days, 
4 but not through my pipeline. 
5 Q. But not through your pipeline, okay. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
13 Q. Let me rephrase it, then 
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14 You've admitted that the Hertshaws have the 
15 right to use some water; correct? 
16 A. I admit that they had the right to use 3 hours 
17 out of every 18 days. 
18 Q. Okay, fine. They had the right to use 3 hours 
19 in 18 days. 
20 Q. How many people are you aware of that have 
21 water rights on Pinecreek? 
22 A. Just me and the State Fish and Game. 
23 Q. You're not aware of anyone else? 
24 A. Well, just Dee, got that 3 hours. 
25 Q. All right Okay. (Record 759-770; 808-819). 
Mr. King's sworn testimony, at his August 23, 2004 deposition, proves beyond 
any doubt whatsoever and conclusively establishes that Mr. Henshaw, contrary to the 
false and fraudulent assertions by the Kings, in their counterclaims, is the owner of all the 
water rights sold to the Watrouses by the Kings. Furthermore, the sworn testimony of 
Mr. King proves beyond any doubt that filing of the Kings' counterclaims seeking to 
quite title to the water rights they admit they sold to the Watrouses, that they admit were 
ultimately acquired by Mr. Henshaw, that they admit are owned by Mr. Henshaw, and the 
maintenance of those fraudulent claims is a per se violation of both Rule 11URCP and 
UCA § 78-27-56. 
By its express terms, rule 11(b) provides that an attorney certifies that the 
requirements of each subpart are independently met. Sub-parts (2) and (3) of Rule 
11(b) pertain to pleadings, motions, or other papers that are frivolous in terms of 
their lack of evidentiary support or legal basis for their maintenance. 
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council. 20 P.3d 307 (Utah 2001). 
The trial court erred as a matter of law when it first refused to rule on Mr. 
Henshaw's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the Kings' quite title claims and 
again when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Motion for a Directed Verdict on the Kings quiet 
title claims. It is beyond Mr. Henshaw's comprehension that the Kings could admit they 
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sold the water rights to the Watrouses and admit that Mr. Henshaw now owns the water 
rights they sold to the Watrouses and yet ask the trial court to quiet title in the water 
rights in them. 
It is, however, even more incomprehensible that the trial court could ignore the 
Kings9 admissions that they sold the water rights to the Watrouses and the Kings 
admissions that Mr. Henshaw now owns the water rights the Kings sold to the Watrouses 
and refuse to grant Mr. Henshaw's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and/or his 
Motion for a Directed Verdict, asking the trial court to rule that he is the owner of the 
water rights, as the Kings have admitted he is. 
Mr. Henshaw's claims, on the other hand, are all supported by facts and supported 
by controlling Utah law, and in the case of Rule 7(2) URCP by a good faith argument for 
reversal or modification of the decision in Tolboe Construction, supra. There is simply 
nothing in Mr. Henshaw's appeal that is a violation of Rule 33 URAP. Therefore, the 
Kings request for sanctions under Rule 33 URCP must be denied as a matter of law, mid 
pursuant to the provisions of UCA § 78-27-56, Mr, Henshaw should be awarded his cost 
and attorney's fees in this matter. 
CONCIUSIQNAND XFQU&ST FQH RELIEF 
The trial court committed plain, prejudicial and reversible error when it granted 
the Kings5 motion for a directed verdict. Because the Kings have no standing to assert 
that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the time of 
Raymond's death, the trial court had no jurisdiction to even hear, much less rule on, the 
Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at the 
time of Raymond's death. Therefore, this Court must reverse that part of Directed 
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Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred Watrous at 
the time of Raymond's death. 
The trial court committed prejudicial and reversible error and abused its discretion 
when it denied Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. Again, because the Kings do not have 
standing to even assert that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death, the trial court had no jurisdiction to hear or rule 
on, the Kings' claim that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. Therefore, the trial court was required, as a 
matter of law, to grant Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion. 
Wherefore, Mr. Henshaw respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's denial of Mr. Henshaw's Rule 60(b) Motion and reverse that portion of the 
Directed Verdict holding that Raymond Watrous' water rights did not pass to Mildred 
Watrous at the time of Raymond's death. Because the Kings' assertion of their "quiet 
title, claims in their counterclaims were a violation of Rule 11 URCP, and because their 
opposition to this appeal is a violation of Rule 11 URCP and UCA § 78-27-56, Mr. 
Henshaw should also be awarded his costs and attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting 
this appeal pursuant to the provisions of UCA § 78-27-56. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s ^ day of July.2007. 
Charles A. Schultz 
Attorney for Dee Henshaw 
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APPENDIX 
UC A 77-27-56. Attorney rsfees ~ Award where action or defense in bad faith ~ 
Exceptions. 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing party 
if the court determines that the action or defense to the action was without merit and not 
brought or asserted in good faith, except under Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may award no fees or limited fees against a party under 
Subsection (1), but only if the court: 
(a) finds the party has filed an affidavit ofimpecuniosity in the action before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the record the reason for not awarding fees under the provisions of 
Subsection (1). 
Rule 58A(d) URCP: 
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment A copy of the signed judgment shall be 
promptly served by the party preparing it in the manner provided in Rule 5. The time for 
filing a notice of appeal is not affected by the requirement of this provision. 
Rule 60(b) URCP: 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On 
motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time 
to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the 
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (I), (2), or (3), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) 
does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
-i-
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery of attorney's fees. 
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal 
case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these rules is 
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include single or 
double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other 
paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a 
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
(c) Procedures, 
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A 
party may request damages under this rule only as part of the appellee's motion for 
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's 
response to a motion or other paper. 
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court shall issue to the 
party or the party's attorney or both an order to show cause why such damages should 
not be awarded. The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the 
basis of the damages and permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise 
ordered for good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of oral 
argument. 
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant 
a hearing. 
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